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The role played by the nation-states of India and Pakistan in the
former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) echoes the animosity
created during the Partition of 1947. The political and social upheaval that
followed upon the creation of the two nation-states in 1947 has left
legacies that continue to haunt the two countries. The Partition enabled the
thunderous forces of violence and displacement to tear the preexisting
cultural and social fabric so systematically that the process of repair hasn't
even begun. I would argue that although the "Third-World" intelligentsia
unceasingly complains about the manipulations and short-sightedness of
British imperial cartographers and administrators, the onus of the calamity
engendered on 14 and 15 August 1947 does not lie entirely on the colonial
power. The failed negotiations between Indian and Pakistani nationalists
who belonged to the Congress and the Muslim League, the blustering of
those nationalists and the national jingoism it stimulated, and the
unquenchable hatreds on both sides contributed to the brutal events of
1947. In the words of historian Uma Kaura, "the mistakes made by the
Congress leadership, the frustration and bitterness of the League
leadership, and the defensive diplomacy of a British Viceroy cumulatively
resulted in the demand for Partition." The borders that were brutally
carved by the authorities at the time of Partition have led to further
brutality in the form of those riots, organized historical distortions, and
cultural depletions with which the histories of independent India and
Pakistan are replete.
One of the legacies of the Partition is the Kashmir conflict, which
is now a nuclear flashpoint. For India, Kashmir lends credibility to its
secular nationalist image. For Pakistan, Kashmir represents the
unfeasibility of secular nationalism and underscores the need for an
Islamic theocracy in the subcontinent. In January 1948, India referred the
Kashmir dispute to the United Nations. Subsequent to the declaration of
the cease-fire between India and Pakistan on January 1, 1949, the state of
J&K was divided into two portions. The part of the state comprising the
Punjabi speaking areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with
Gilgit and Baltistan was incorporated into Pakistan, whereas the portion of
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the state comprising the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and the large Jammu
region was politically assimilated into India. Currently, a large part of
J&K is administered by India and a portion is administered by Pakistan.
China also annexed a section of the land in 1962, through which it has
built a road that links Tibet to Xiajiang. Although, separatist movements
have been surfacing and resurfacing in J&K and parts of Pakistani
administered Kashmir since the accession of the state to India in 1947, the
attempt to create a unitary cultural identity bolstered by nationalist politics
has been subverted by regional political forces, backed-up by the
governments of India and Pakistan. The culturally, linguistically, and
religiously diverse population of Indian and Pakistani administered Jammu
and Kashmir has been unable to reach a consensus on the future of the
land and the heterogeneous peoples of the state. The notion that social
tensions and weaknesses can be redressed by an essential Islamic or Hindu
culture ends up fortifying religious fundamentalism in communities. The
strategic location of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
underscores its importance for both India and Pakistan.
The state of J & K borders on China and Afghanistan. Out of a
total land area of 222,236 square kilometers, 78,114 are under Pakistani
administration, 5,180 square kilometers were handed over to China by
Pakistan, 37,555 square kilometers are under Chinese administration in
Leh district, and the remaining area is under Indian administration (Census
of India, 1981: 156). In order to make their borders impregnable, it was
essential for both India and Pakistan to control the state politically and
militarily.
Although Pakistan distinctly expresses its recognition of the status
of J&K as a disputed territory, it dithers from doing so in areas of the state
under Pakistani control. Pakistan arbitrarily maintains its de facto
government in Azad Kashmir. South Asia affairs analyst Victoria
Schofield (2001) astutely observes: ‘There is no question . . . of Pakistan
ever agreeing to relinquish control of the area, either to form part of an
independent state of Jammu and Kashmir or as an independent state in its
own right.’ Therefore, advocating self-determination for the entire former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir would irreparably damage
Pakistan’s political and military interests.
In the age of globalization, India’s policy vis-à-vis Kashmir has
been influenced by various variables. Pakistan’s formal political alignment
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with the United States of America motivated the Soviet Union, in the
1950s, to overtly support the Indian stance towards Kashmir.
The explicit political support of the Soviet Union in the Cold War era
bolstered Jawaharlal Nehru’s courage, and, in 1956, Nehru reneged on his
earlier ‘international commitments’ on the floor of the Indian parliament.
He proclaimed the legitimacy of the accession of Kashmir to India in
1947, which ostensibly had been ratified by the Constituent Assembly of
J&K in 1954. Nehru’s well thought-out strategy was deployed in full
measure when the Soviet Union vetoed the demand for a plebiscite in
Kashmir made at a meeting of the UN Security Council convened at
Pakistan’s behest. It was in 1953 that Pakistan initiated negotiations with
the USA for military assistance.
Subsequent to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India lost its
powerful ally (Kodikara 1993). India’s relations with the US reeked of
distrust and paranoia at the time. This worsened when senior officials in
the first Clinton administration questioned the legality of the status of
Kashmir as a part of the Indian Union (Battye 1993). The nonproliferation
agenda of the
US in South Asia actively undermined India’s proliferation strategy in the
early and mid-1990s (Perkovich 1999: 318–403).Washington’s agenda
was propelled by the fear that South Asia had burgeoning potential for a
nuclear war in the future. Pakistan’s overt policy of abetting fanatical
elements in Kashmir and Afghanistan led to its political insularity and
seemingly legitimized India’s proactive approach.
The US adopted the policy of persuading both India and Pakistan
to actively participate in the nonproliferation regime by agreeing to
comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to an
interim cap on fissile-material production (‘Interview with Strobe Talbott’,
The Hindu, 14 January 2000). The insurgency in J&K, which has extracted
an enormous price from the people of the state, was generated by the
systemic erosion of democratic and human rights, discrimination against
the Muslims of the Valley, socioeconomic marginalization, relegation of
the right to self-determination to the background, etc. While the rebellion
may have been incited by India’s political, social, and economic
tactlessness, it has been sustained by military, political, and economic
support from Pakistan. Proponents of the independence of the state of J&K
are just as stridently opposed to Pakistan’s administration of Azad
Kashmir as they are to India’s administration of J&K. During the ongoing
insurgency, the Indian military has been granted carte blanche without an
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iota of accountability. Custodial disappearances and deaths continue to
occur, and official orders regarding the protection of detainees are
brazenly rubbished. The introduction of other severe laws by the
Government of India has made it further non-obligatory to provide any
measure of accountability in the military and political proceedings in the
state. Despite these highly discriminatory and unpopular measures, the
support enjoyed by some of the militant organizations in the early 1990s
abated by the mid-90s. Pakistan has won the disapprobation of
international powers by adopting the policy of fighting proxy wars through
radical Islamist groups, which has reinforced New Delhi’s confidence that
the internationalization of the Kashmir dispute would not get unwieldy.
India also believes that the restraint it exercised during the 1998 nuclear
tests has given it the reputation of a responsible nuclear power.
Despite international pressure, the India–Pakistan crisis has not
been defused; on the contrary, it is highly volatile. Given their interests in
South Asia, Russia and China have expressed their concern about the
brinksmanship between the two countries. In order to facilitate a
rapprochement, President Vladimir Putin of Russia offered to play the role
of mediator between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani
President Musharraf at the scheduled regional summit conference in
Almaty, Kazakhistan. Both Putin and the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin,
held talks with Vajpayee and Musharraf in order to create a space for
political negotiations. But the two heads of state continued to remain aloof
and uncompromisingly condemned each other’s belligerence. The one
positive outcome of the summit talks, however, was the proposal of the
Indian government for joint patrolling of the Line of Control (LOC) by
Indian and Pakistani forces. But the Pakistani government was quick to
reject this proposal and expressed the requirement for building a thirdparty force instead. Subsequently, the lethal and hitherto readily adopted
practice of maneuvering a dangerous situation to the limits of tolerance
mellowed, due to Vajpayee’s and Musharraf’s judicious approach to
nuclear warfare. But the simmering grievances between India and
Pakistan, and the distress of the Kashmiri people remained unredressed.
The Pakistani military reinforced western concerns regarding
nuclear proliferation in South Asia. In reaction to Pakistan’s aggressive
transgression of the LOC India exercised political tact and restraint,
winning international support for its diplomacy. Washington’s political
volte face became apparent when it explicitly demanded that Islamabad
withdraw from occupied Indian positions and maintain the legitimacy of
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the LOC in Kashmir. It was implicit in this demand that it saw Pakistan as
the egregious aggressor. The attempt by the US to mitigate Pakistan’s
aggression also implied that it would not reinforce the status quo in
Kashmir (Kampani 2005: 171). Washington’s incrimination of Pakistani
aggression mitigated New Delhi’s fear that internationalization of the
Kashmir dispute would spell unambiguous victory for Pakistan. India’s
strategy of diplomacy and restraint increased the international pressure on
Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Indian Territory. India took recourse
to limited conventional war under nuclear conditions, prior to President
Clinton’s March 2000 visit to New Delhi. This issue further receded to the
background during the Bush administration. The neo-conservatives in that
administration zeroed in on India as a country in the Asia–Pacific region
that would offset China’s burgeoning economy (‘US–South Asia Relations
under Bush’ 2001). US strategic ties with New Delhi were further
consolidated in the wake of 11 September 2001, when the links between
militant Islamic groups and Pakistan’s military and militia forces were
underscored.
As one of the consequences of the decision of the Bush
administration to eliminate Al-Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan,
Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharaff found himself with no option but to
sever ties with the Taliban. Following this drastically changed policy
decision to withdraw political and military support from the Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, Islamabad found itself unable to draw a clear line of
distinction between ‘terrorists’ in Afghanistan and ‘freedom fighters’ in
Kashmir. Islamabad’s quandary proved New Delhi’s trump card
(Chaudhuri 2001). New Delhi was able to justify its military stance vis-àvis Pakistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the J&K State
Assembly in the summer capital, Srinagar, in October 2001, and then the
attacks on the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, a month later, in November.
New Delhi’s strategy was validated by US military operations in
Afghanistan, and the deployment of US forces in and around Pakistan to
restrain Pakistani aggression. India was assured by the US that it would
stall any attempt by Pakistan to extend the Kashmir dispute beyond local
borders, which might disrupt its operations against the Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban. Also, deployment of the US military in Pakistani air bases
strengthened New Delhi’s confidence that Islamabad would hesitate to
initiate nuclear weapons use (Kampani 2002). The result of India’s policy
of coercive diplomacy was that the Musharraf regime was pressured by
the US to take strict military action against the mercenary and militant
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Islamic groups bolstering the insurgency in Kashmir. New Delhi was
successful in getting Islamabad to both privately and publicly renounce its
support to insurgents in J&K. The Indian administration decided that in
the event deterrence measures failed, the Indian army would have to fight
a limited conventional war under nuclear conditions. The possibility of
fighting a war has driven the Indian government to contemplate a nuclear
response to Pakistan’s deployment of nuclear weapons (see Chengappa
2000). But Indian leaders have threatened Islamabad with punitive
measures if Pakistan resorts to nuclear-weapons use (Tellis 2001: 251–
475). India and Pakistan routinely brandish their nuclear capabilities to
intimidate each other. The two countries have also resorted to direct
nuclear signaling through ballistic-missile tests. Such strategies emphasize
the military and political volatility in South Asia. Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal has given its military the prowess it requires to exploit the
disgruntlement of the Muslim population of the Kashmir Valley. India’s
cautious stance is however dictated by multiple factors. Its primary
concern is that a limited war will not enable it to accomplish substantive
political or military objectives; that such a war might spin out of control
and would be impossible to cease according to the wishes of the
administration and the military; that India might find itself in disfavor with
and spurned by the international community, and that a war might beef up
nuclear armament. The impending menace of precipitative nuclearization
has been one of the many factors underlining the necessity to maintain a
quasi-stable regime in the South Asian region (Kampani 2005: 177).
Pakistan’s explicit aiding and abetting of insurgents in Kashmir
has created misgiving about its strategies, and enabled India to prevent UN
mediation. New Delhi managed to diminish the threat of
internationalization of the Kashmir dispute in 2001–02 by threatening a
nuclear exchange unless the US intervened to prevent Pakistan from
fomenting cross-border terrorism (ibid.: 178). The insurgency in Kashmir,
India and Pakistan’s ideological differences and their political
intransigence could result in the eruption of a future crisis. The
atmosphere of paranoia and mistrust is exacerbated by the frightening
attempts of Hindu fundamentalist groups to rewrite Indian history and the
recasting of Pakistani history by Islamist organizations: efforts to radically
redefine Indian and Pakistani societies in the light of ritualistic Hinduism
and Islam, respectively.
In the wake of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in December 2007,
the politically chaotic climate of Pakistan, the belligerence of the military,
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and the tenacious control of fundamentalist forces basking in the glories of
a misplaced religious fervor, can India and Pakistan produce visionary
leaders capable of looking beyond the expediency of warfare,
conventional or otherwise? Preparing to lead the new coalition
government in Pakistan, co-chairperson of the Pakistan People’s Party and
Benazir’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, condemned the distrustful
atmosphere created in the Indian subcontinent by the Kashmir imbroglio.
While underwriting the importance of fostering amicable relations
between the two countries, Zardari said that the Kashmir conflict could be
placed in a state of temporary suspension, for future generations to
resolve. In the age of globalization, will the besieged populace of the state
of Jammu and Kashmir remain beholden to a leadership that doles out
crumbs to them while dividing the spoils amongst themselves?
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